Household Finance in Contemporary Capitalism:






Household Finance in Contemporary Capitalism:  
Facts in Search of Theory 
 
Gregory W. Fuller 
 
 
Abstract: Both International and Comparative Political Economy have a blind spot 
where households – and particularly households' finances – are concerned. This is a 
problem. Household financial activities have a large and growing impact on economic 
outcomes; however, our understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms remains 
weak. This weakness stems from the fact that discussions of household finance are 
limited – and what discussions are taking place are spread across scholarly communities 
that don’t always communicate well with one another. This paper attempts to rectify that 
problem. It surveys the existing theoretical treatments of household financial activities, 
provides data showing that those activities are important, and lays out both a framework 
and a research agenda for examining the role of household finance in contemporary 
capitalism. In doing so, it reveals opportunities for cross-pollination between IPE, CPE, 
and scholarship concerning "financialization." 
 
 
Preliminary conference draft prepared for EUSA 2015. Please do not cite or circulate. 







Both International and Comparative Political Economy (IPE and CPE, respectively) have 
a blind spot where households – and particularly households' finances – are concerned. 
This is a problem. As households' access to financial markets has improved, both sides of 
their balance sheets have expanded dramatically, enhancing the household sector's impact 
on domestic and international economic outcomes. Household financial activities have a 
major impact on growth performance, macroeconomic volatility, and external 
indebtedness. Moreover, households’ savings and borrowing behavior profoundly affects 
the operating environment of both financial and non-financial firms.  
Despite these facts, households remain of relatively marginal interest to political 
economists. IPE examines globalization and interdependence primarily through the 
actions and interactions of states, international organizations, and firms. CPE – 
particularly institutionalist CPE – also tends to focus on firms and their relationship with 
the state. When they are discussed, households are either treated as a factor of production 
or are discussed within the context of social programs.  
This is a major oversight. Empirically, household financial activities appear to 
have a large and growing impact on economic outcomes; however, our understanding of 
the underlying causal mechanisms remains weak. This weakness stems, in large part, 
from the fact that discussions of household finance are limited – and what discussions are 
taking place are spread across scholarly communities that don’t always communicate 
well with one another. This paper attempts to rectify that problem. It surveys the existing 
theoretical treatments of household financial activities, provides an empirical sketch of 
how those activities are important, and lays out both a framework and a research agenda 
for examining the role of household finance in contemporary capitalism. In doing so, I 
hope to reveal opportunities for cross-pollination between IPE, CPE, and scholarship 
concerning "financialization."  
The paper is organized into four sections. The first conducts a survey of how 
these three academic communities think about households' role domestically and in the 
global economy. The second marshals existing research from across a number of fields – 
combining it with novel data from OECD countries – to establish a macro-level picture of 
the impact households' financial decisions have on wider economic outcomes. The third 
section then argues that we need to establish a discussion of household finance that 
crosses scholarly borders, presenting a framework for examining household finance that 
speaks equally to multiple literatures. The fourth and concluding section highlights the 
key puzzles and challenges that pursuing such a research agenda would entail.  
 
 
I: Capitalism and the Household 
The potential benefits of a fuller treatment of household finance are most pronounced in 
three intellectual communities: IPE, CPE, and the various schools of heterodox 
macroeconomics concerned with the "financialization" phenomenon. This section 
provides thumbnail sketches of those fields and how they treat households and household 
finance – to the extent that they engage with households at all.  
The relative dearth of household-focused research in these fields becomes 
particularly evident when contrasted with how mainstream macroeconomics deals with 
households. Orthodox macroeconomics – either referring to older Keynesian insights into 
the national income accounting identity or the more in-vogue dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models – envision households as playing a central role in 
determining economic equilibria. On the simplest level, consumption is the largest 
component of output as defined by the accounting identity – and economists have a long-
standing interest in the link between consumer finance and consumption. There are a 
number of well-established discussions over whether households use financial markets to 
“smooth” their consumption over time (Mankiw 2000), how households construct their 
portfolios (Guiso et al. 2002), and how consumers mentally process the act of becoming 
indebted (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Contemporary DSGE models – that is, models 
of an entire economy based on the actions of many individual agents – have also have a 
history of including household finance in their models (although it is a short one) 
(Iacoviello 2005; Pataracchia et al. 2013).  
While mainstream macroeconomics does have a track record of seeing households 
as key shapers of economic equilibria, the field is limited in other ways. Because it is not 
especially sophisticated in its incorporation of institutions – and because the field 
assumes a large degree of causal universalism – it is generally blind to how markets 
evolve over time and diverge across space. What divides orthodox economists from their 
heterodox brethren is the view that markets exist in a constant state of disequilibrium, 
fundamentally subject to alteration through policy innovation, institutional transformation, 
and shifting norms. This same interest in how the underlying structures of capitalism 
evolve is found in IPE and CPE as well. In order to see how households participate in 
capitalist change – not merely in the determination of economic output – we must look to 
these communities. And here, households have been of more marginal interest. 
 
Households in IPE 
IPE was born from two needs: The first was the need to redress the "dialog of the deaf" 
between Economics and International Relations (Cohen 2008). The second was for a 
better understanding of the increasing complexity and density of cross-national economic 
linkages. By the late-1960s and early 1970s, global capitalism had begun the inexorable 
march away from a system of largely independent parts and toward today's largely 
unified system. IPE came out of efforts to understand the consequences of that shift (c.f. 
Cooper 1980; Keohane and Nye 2012). 
The liberalization of global capital flows has arguably been the most important 
component of complex international interdependence. The need for capital – and the 
dangers of capital fleeing a national system – has been a central concern of IPE from the 
beginning. Capital movements transmit shocks between countries and constrain 
policymakers' options (Cooper 1980). The benefits of freer access to capital create 
opportunity costs for countries that forego those benefits in order to remain closed 
(Keohane and Milner 1996). Accommodating this change largely meant the abandonment 
of fixed exchange rates. Finance – no longer a "servant" to domestic policymakers – 
could wreak havoc on exchange rates by exiting from undesirable national systems 
(Helleiner 1996). The pressure to compete for access to international capital incentivizes 
convergent financial reforms, potentially stoking convergence on common policies 
(Cerny 1997).  
Originally, households only entered this discussion either as vulnerable victims or 
as factors of production. Susan Strange (1986), for instance, noted that the ascendancy of 
unpredictable financial market could victimize less sophisticated financial actors 
(implicitly including households) who possessed few tools for managing their new 
exposures to the global "casino." Likewise, Jeffry Frieden (1991) is indicative of the bias 
toward thinking of households as labor. That is, he considered labor in the context of 
their relationship with employers rather than as guardians of their own purchasing power 
(which would suggest different preferences toward exchange rates).   
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 has pushed households closer to the center 
of the discussion – though only to a certain extent. In a review of the key literature 
concerned with the rise of global finance prior to the crisis, Richard Deeg and Mary 
O'Sullivan (2009) identified a number of essential works focused on financial firms, 
ratings agencies, governance structures, and capital account liberalization – but none that 
dealt with household financial activities in much depth. Numerous pre-crisis works did 
warn of instability produced by exotic financial instruments based on household 
borrowing – and most post-crisis autopsies focused on those instruments to some degree 
(c.f. Helleiner 2011). Nevertheless, most of these analyses treat households' involvement 
as incidental, focusing instead on how such financial products distributed risk within the 
financial system. Few saw households as anything more than an exogenous source of the 
borrowing needed to create those products in the first place. 
This exclusion cannot be attributed to a lack of methodological tools or 
paradigmatic frameworks. In the dominant “Open Economy Politics” (OEP) approach to 
IPE, the tools for including household sector forces exist. Households form preferences 
over economic policy and have those preferences aggregated and articulated through 
domestic institutions whose actions generate outcomes that feed back into households’ 
preference formation (Lake 2009). Even Thomas Oatley’s (2011) robust critique of OEP 
scholarship does not really come into play because households’ preferences are not likely 
to be heavily influenced by international politics. The problem is one of emphasis, not 
approach: IPE has viewed households as victims of globalization, as labor, and now as a 
relatively homogenous pool of borrowers used to produce financial weapons of mass 
destruction. It does not tend to think of them as users of capital themselves.  
There are some exceptions to this diagnosis. Ethan Kapstein's (2006) somewhat 
prophetic review of the international financial architecture for the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) noted that the increased integration of households into the financial 
system produced special economic and political dangers. Likewise, Maurice Obstfeld and 
Kenneth Rogoff's (2009) discussion of the crisis prepared for the US Federal Reserve 
heavily emphasized household behaviors: household borrowing in the US and household 
saving in China were the sine qua non for both the emergence of mid-2000s 
macroeconomic imbalances and, ultimately, for the crisis. Interestingly, both papers were 
produced for policy audiences rather than academic ones.  
The impact of capitalist change on households is also of central concern in 
feminist IPE and in the "daily life IPE" literature. Genevieve LeBaron (2010, 908, 890) 
echoes the raison d'être of this paper, arguing that there is a need to "more clearly 
establish variations in households over time and how these shifts have been shaped by, 
and shape, the social relations of capitalism." This then constitutes a partial response to 
her call "to overcome the gendered division of academic labour within political economy 
wherein feminists theorize reproduction and households, and non-feminists maintain a 
focus on trade, production and finance. As with feminist IPE, it deals extensively with the 
household; as with non-feminist IPE, it is primarily concerned with patterns of trade, 
production, and especially finance. 
Even within IPE communities that do focus on households, there remains a 
tendency to understate the importance of household finance. The increasingly unified 
global pool of capital is based to a growing degree on household borrowing. The market 
for innovative financial products is limited, in large part, by the willingness of consumers 
to take on debt. Where households are willing to take on such debt – and where 
regulatory regimes are amenable to the creation of such products – the balance of 
payments becomes skewed toward financial account surpluses and current account 
deficits. Where they are not, the balance of payments moves in the opposite direction.  
In sum, without the financial integration of the household, the defining 
characteristics of the post-1970s global economy – the growing balance sheets, 
intensified capital flows, innovative financial institutions, and persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances – would look very different. Given that households are a key ingredient in 
determining the volume and direction of global financial flows, it stands to reason that 
IPE should focus more closely on what households are doing – and why. 
 
Households in CPE 
The arguably national focus of OEP has muddied the distinction between IPE and CPE 
(Keohane 2009). However, a community of self-consciously comparative political 
economy scholars remains distinct – and uniquely valuable in their ability to explain 
households' divergent behaviors and the impact they have on currents across the global 
sea of financial capital. Yet while a comparative investigation of household finance 
would be of great benefit to the broader CPE literature, there has been surprisingly little 
research in that direction. 
In the decades following the initial surge of financial globalization that gave rise 
to IPE, the dominant discussion within CPE became whether national systems would 
retain a distinctive character or converge on a single liberal model (c.f. Berger and Dore 
1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny 2005). As the 
international economy became more integrated, countries increasingly felt pressure to 
conform to emerging international norms in order to compete and remain attractive to 
capital. Even so, advanced capitalist systems continue to look very different from one 
another. This tension between convergence and diversity is implicitly or explicitly at the 
heart of CPE’s key texts, including Peter Hall and David Soskice's (2001) Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) and the works that followed in its wake. 
This debate, and particularly institutionalist accounts of capitalist diversity such 
as the VoC framework, has focused extensively on non-financial firms and their relations 
with both labor and the state. Households, interpreted through this lens, are largely 
considered in terms of their role in productive enterprise – for instance, through collective 
bargaining systems and wage-moderation regimes. Until recently, the same bias was 
evident in the treatment of financial firms. VoC approaches to capitalism were always 
light in their treatment of finance, relying extensively on John Zysman's (1984) 
dichotomy between bank-based and capital market-based financial systems – again 
focusing on financial firms' relationships with industry. The thin treatment of finance has 
been partially rectified since the financial crisis (Hardie et al. 2013); however, 
engagement with households has remained limited.  
 
Where CPE does engage with household finance, it is often from the perspective 
of the welfare state (such as in Esping-Andersen 1990) and social policy more generally 
(Schelkle 2012a).  In particular, these scholars have made important strides in 
highlighting access to financial resources as a potential substitute for traditional welfare 
state spending (Ansell 2014). Cash-strapped governments shifting the burden of looking 
after households' needs onto the financial system also features prominently in Raghuram 
Rajan's (2010) analysis of systemic problems in the United States – though his Fault 
Lines lacks a comparative dimension. This is a key finding; however, it is only one aspect 
of the role that household finance in fostering cross-national capitalist diversity. Given 
the role that housing prices played in the financial crisis, there is also a substantial body 
of work that focuses on the connection between household finance and home prices 
(Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009; Schelkle 2012b; Johnston and Regan 201X).  
There has been some limited work on the broader economic consequences of 
household finance policy beyond the housing sphere (Schwartz 2012; Fuller 2015). These 
works take steps toward the full incorporation of households into the discussion of 
capitalism, its post-1970s evolution, and its diverse national forms. However, they are 
also of limited theoretical ambit. They focus on the determinants of household activities 
and on narrow causal linkages to macroeconomic outcomes but tend to avoid making 
broader statements about wider change in capitalist structures. Finding these broader 
statements means looking beyond the boundaries of the IPE and CPE literatures 
discussed so far – to the disparate collection of scholars interested in the 
"financialization" phenomenon.   
 
Financialization, Heterodox Macroeconomics, and the Household 
While the IPE and CPE are highly integrated scholarly communities, groups within 
heterodox macroeconomics have carried on parallel – and sometimes overlapping – 
discussions. These scholars, many of whom are best identified as international political 
economists but come from backgrounds in radical economics, are more attuned to 
fundamental transformations of capitalism than their more mainstream brethren. Nowhere 
is this emphasis clearer than in research focused on "financialization," very broadly 
defined as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors 
and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies" 
(Epstein 2005). 
The first to identify the financialization phenomenon (and to give it a name) were 
Marxists who sensed that the rising importance of financial activities signaled a shift in 
capitalism’s mode of production. Naturally, this would have consequences for the 
distribution of power and economic resources (beginning with Hilferding 1981, 
continuing with Magdoff and Sweezy 1987, and evident in works like Arrighi 1994). 
However, it is other islands within the heterodox epistemic archipelago that have 
incorporated households into their analyses of financialization more completely. These 
are, chiefly, the small community of British "social accountants" clustered around Julie 
Froud and Karel Williams at the University of Manchester, the French Regulation School 
as championed by Robert Boyer, and certain groups of post-Keynesian (or post-
Kaleckian) economists.  
The social accounting approach to household financialization shares much with 
the French Regulation School in terms of their approaches. Both see the household sector 
primarily as savers who – through buying retail savings products – theoretically gain a 
measure of ownership over a society's productive capacities. This makes them 
stakeholders in productive firms and gives them an interest in those firms boosting profits 
and maximizing shareholder value. Where conventional thinking suggests that the battle 
between labor and capital is zero-sum (in the short-term), this form of social 
reorganization erodes any such distinction between labor and capital because labor holds 
capital. Systemically, households become shareholders, firms become increasingly bound 
to maximize shareholder value, and the financial sector intermediates between the two. 
(Boyer 2001; Froud, Johal, and Williams 2002).   
Taken to an extreme, such a democratization of finance might allow households 
to escape "the tyranny of earned income" as their returns as rentiers becomes more 
important than their wages as workers (Froud et al. 2010). The régulationistes go further 
than the social accountants in building a theoretical superstructure that presents this as a 
possibility: they see the finance-led growth regime is an entirely different economic 
model that could sustainably supersede "Fordist" production based on physical capital 
accumulation. In contrast, Froud and her colleagues are more skeptical. They argue that 
while growing savings and enhanced shareholder control have manifestly benefited 
financial institutions, households themselves remain bound to their fate as laborers.  
Likewise, financialization scholarship in the Kaleckian tradition maintains that 
finance-led growth has not been as evident as the phenomenon of profit sans 
l'accumulation (Stockhammer 2004; Cordonnier 2006). That is, holders of financial 
capital have extracted value from productive enterprises and restricted those enterprises 
from investing. A more strident view argues that firms now have clear incentives to 
"downsize and distribute," essentially cannibalizing themselves in order to pay off 
shareholders (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2001). Most of this research focuses on the firm – 
particularly the work of Englebert Stockhammer (2004; 2006; 2008), James Crotty (2005; 
2008), and Thomas Dallery (2009) – or on the links between financialization and wealth 
concentration (Power, Epstein, and Abrena 2003; Duménil and Lévy 2005). However, 
there have also been some attempts to create overarching models (similar to in 
mainstream macroeconomics) that treat household finance as a key variable in 
determining overall economic activity (van Treeck 2009; Hein 2012).  
Such theories – frequently found at the margins of mainstream IPE scholarship – 
are radical but valuable. They succeed at integrating a number of concurrent 
developments that are often addressed separately: the enormous growth of global 
financial markets, households' integration into those markets, the proliferation of 
financial products based on household borrowing, the embrace of financial markets as 
social policy tool by policymakers, rising profits despite rising structural unemployment, 
and the enhanced power of shareholders over productive enterprise.  
 
* * * 
Ultimately, the problem with the theoretical treatment of households in these fields is 
twofold: first, household finance is largely consigned to peripheral academic discussions; 
second, many of the conversations of household finance are happening separately rather 
than building off one another. This lack of discussion concerning the political and 
economic import of households' balance sheet management would be entirely justifiable 
if households weren't actually that important. The next section demonstrates that this is 
certainly not the case.  
  
II: The Rise of Household Finance 
A stylized narrative of the transformation of household finance begins with the wider 
story of global financial liberalization – a process that began in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (Vives 2000). Before this period, households' financial interactions were sharply 
curtailed through policies of so-called financial "repression:" limits placed on financial 
institutions (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). Pre-liberalization financial markets were  
characterized by state-controlled interest rates, quantitative credit restrictions, state-
sanctioned cartels, rules prohibiting one type of financial institution from conducting 
activities assigned to another, fixed commissions and fees, and protection against 
intrusion by foreign firms and foreign capital.  
Though the exact nature of these restrictions varied from country to country, one 
universal consequence was to restrict the amount of credit available to retail borrowers. 
Chartering restrictions – legal restrictions on what activities banks were permitted to do – 
often reserved mortgage-lending for specialized institutions. For example, Britain's 
Building Societies and Spain's Banco Hipotecario had near-complete monopolies on 
those countries' mortgage markets until the 1980s. Quantitative credit restrictions – such 
as the "corset" in Britain or the encadrement du credit system in France – sharply 
curtailed the overall amount that banks could lend. The prevention of cross-border 
financial transactions meant that a national system's lending capacity was limited to the 
amount of capital that could be raised within a single country's borders.  
Liberalization meant the end of these practices. Fixed interest rates and 
commissions were eliminated. Quantitative credit restrictions were abolished. Chartering 
restrictions were phased out. The state withdrew from both the direct ownership of banks 
and the indirect practice of influencing banks' lending decisions. Perhaps most 
importantly, restrictions on foreign ownership of financial institutions were largely 
abandoned. These liberalizing moves were a double-edged sword for financial 
institutions: they gained the freedom to engage in a much wider range of activities and 
gained access to larger pools of international capital. At the same time, the elimination of 
national barriers to capital and the abolition of chartering restrictions meant that they 
faced far more competitive environments (c.f. Edey and Hviding 1995).  
  As a result, the 1980s and 1990s saw banks undergo a competitive transformation. 
Smaller institutions failed or were purchased by growing universal banks – many of 
which operated across borders. The balance sheets of these larger institutions expanded 
as banks made up for falling margins with greater volume. Above all, financial 
institutions engaged in an unprecedented period of innovation, developing new 
instruments to facilitate their expansion.  
Each of these changes had a tremendous impact on households' access to financial 
resources. As banks grew their balance sheets, they needed new borrowers – and, 
increasingly, they have looked to households. The incorporation of specialized consumer 
lenders into larger universal banks – together with the industry-wide expansion of 
balance sheets – unified large banks' capital with specialized lenders' market share. The 
advent of securitization allowed banks to sell marketable derivative assets based on 
consumer borrowing. This made it easier to raise funds for consumer lending further 
expanding the pool of potentially loanable funds. In short, financial liberalization had an 
effect on households that was arguably as significant as the effect on banks – and the end 
result of that change was to greatly improve households' access to financial markets 
(Fuller 2015). 
Though the liberalization process began in earnest over three decades ago, the full 
effects of liberalization have become more apparent since the mid-1990s. This is partly 
because liberalization did not take hold in many developed economies – especially in 
Continental Europe – until the 1990s. Even then, the impetus for reform among the 
laggards had much to do with adjustments required to complete the single market and 
prepare for the launch of the euro. Similarly, innovation in financial instruments took 
time to spread across the Atlantic: securitization did not become common in Europe until 
near the end of the 1990s. As a result of this slow global roll-out, the best evidence of the 
rise of household finance comes from the past twenty years.  
On a superficial level, the role of households in the global economy is plain to 
see: consumption has comprised roughly 60 percent of all economic activity in OECD 
countries since the mid-twentieth century. Even this measure understates households' 
impact on overall economic performance: investment in housing comprises an additional 
share of gross fixed capital formation – accounting for nearly one third of all investment 
by the 2000s. As figure 1 shows, household economic activity have grown modestly 
more significant over the past several decades. After remaining flat from the 1960s 
through the 1980s, the share of national income generated by consumption has risen 
steadily, reaching over 62 percent by the early 2010s. Including residential investment, 
that figure climbs as high as 70 percent in some countries – most notably in the United 
States.  
While this may seem like a minor change, the sheer amounts involved make it 
noteworthy. While the output of all sectors of the economy has grown, the spending of 
households has grown faster. Taking 2014 as a benchmark, one percent of OECD-wide 
GDP amounted to $477 billion. Comparing 2014 to the 1960s, that is the equivalent of 
taking over $1 trillion from businesses (whose share has shrunk as households' has risen) 
and giving it to households instead. Because the determinants and consequences of 
household spending differ markedly from firm spending, this will undoubtedly affect the 
wider economy. 
These figures are the tip of the iceberg in terms of households' increased 
command of economic resources. While consumers' dominant role in determining global 
expenditure is neither new nor surprising, less attention has been paid to the rising share 
of financial resources committed to household use. Not only has household debt risen 
sharply over the past few decades, households' borrowing has grown far faster than both 
government borrowing and non-financial firm borrowing. As figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, 
the ratio of household debt to both non-financial sector debt and government debt has 
increased markedly since the mid-1990s. This is particularly striking given that the debt 
loads of all economic actors grew significantly during this period. This means that there 
has been a tremendous reallocation of financial resources toward households – one that 
dwarfs households' relative increase in spending.  
Furthermore, these figures understate the degree to which household borrowing 
has resulted in capital reallocation. Financial firms’ own debt burdens are often directly 
attributable to household activities. When a household borrows funds for a mortgage 
from a bank, that money has to come from somewhere. In the most traditional financial 
system, that “somewhere” is often households themselves: banks take their savings (as 
deposits) and then lend out those funds as loans. In a contemporary financial system, 
“somewhere” is harder to define. In some cases, banks borrow money from wholesale 
capital markets (i.e., from other banks). In others, they raise the funds to make mortgages 
by selling the mortgages they make in order to form mortgage-backed securities. In either 
case, the financial firm itself takes on a liability to match the one incurred by households. 
But things can get more complicated. Each time a derivative product is formed 
out of existing assets, it creates both new assets and new liabilities within the financial 
sector. For example, chopping up a mortgage-backed security and repackaging it as a 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) creates a new asset for whoever buys the CDO – 
and a new liability for whoever owns the mortgage backed securities that provide the 
payment streams within the CDO. This process of dividing and repackaging assets can 
continue indefinitely – and each time the payment streams on existing assets are 
organized into new derivative assets, new assets and liabilities appear in the financial 
sector. At the heart of this financial labyrinth, however, lies the original household 
transaction: it is their payments that have ultimately been combined and recombined 
multiple times. Without their payments, there could be no derivative assets. What this 
means is simple: every household mortgage or loan that is securitized causes household 
debt to grow and produces many times that growth on the balance sheets of the financial 
sector. 
Data from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) makes 
clear that this link between household borrowing, securitization, and financial sector debt 
cannot be understated. In the United States, for example, more than 80 percent of all 
securitized assets were based on underlying borrowing by households – and new issuance 
of US securitized assets in 2007 alone amounted to roughly $3 trillion.  While not all of 
the expansion in financial sector liabilities can be chalked up to financial institutions’ 
relationships with households, a substantial amount certainly can be. And, as figures 4 
and 5 show, the relative growth of financial sector debt has been even more striking than 
that of the household sector.  
In sum, the financial integration of the household has caused (1) a modest but 
quantitatively significant reallocation of spending from business to households; (2) a 
significant increase in the relative share of financial resources flowing toward 
households; (3) part of the reallocation of financial resources toward the financial sector 
itself. But what do these changes mean? The evidence suggests they are problematic.  
Accounts of the "finance-growth nexus" – the hypothesis that financial 
intermediation enhances economic growth – rely heavily on the Schumpeterian notion 
that financial markets spur growth by allowing productive economic actors to engage in 
entrepreneurship and productivity-enhancing investment (c.f., King and Levine 1993). 
The nexus, conceived of in this way, does not place any value in household borrowing. 
Though there are exceptions, households do not generally use their sources in productive 
ways; instead, they use borrowed funds to consume or invest in non-productive 
residential property. While this may fuel economic growth in the short term by boosting 
consumption and causing asset prices to rise, this growth is not self-sustaining in the way 
that industrial credit might be. A reallocation of financial resources to households is 
therefore of dubious social value: it represents a shift of capital from productive to 
unproductive uses.  
There are three potential negative consequences to consider. First, as illustrated 
most recently by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi (2014), increased household indebtedness 
generates macroeconomic instability. This is consistent with evidence from past boom-
bust cycles: household borrowing is essentially procyclical, driving up economic growth 
in expansions and then causing more protracted recessions once a period of expansion 
ends (M. King 1994). Data from OECD countries during the post-2000s period provides 
further support for this idea: household debt growth was positively correlated with 
consumption growth from 2000-07 and then negatively correlated with consumption 
growth over the 2008-12 period.  
Second, there are several reasons to believe that a finance-growth nexus 
predicated on household indebtedness will lead to heightened inequality. In order to 
realize capital gains, a person has to hold some amount of capital to begin with (or have 
the reputation to sustain heavy borrowing). This incumbency effect means that the 
wealthier an individual is, the better positioned they are to benefit from increased access 
to resources (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Trumbull 2012). More straightforwardly, an 
expanding financial sector itself produces inequality through the disproportionately large 
compensation it offers to a few of its employees. Though the data available is sparse, 
figure 6 does appear to suggest that larger financial sectors are correlated with greater 
shares of national income accruing to the top 1 percent of earners.  
Additionally, the creditor-debtor relationship is structured in such a way that long-
run increases in inequality are all-but assured: as households borrow, their purchasing 
power today increases but their wealth and future purchasing power falls (they now have 
a debt obligation and the interest payments that come with it). For society's creditors, the 
reverse is true – they surrender some of their purchasing power today (the amount lent) in 
order to increase their incomes (interest payments) and wealth (the underlying loan asset). 
Since net borrowers tend to be poorer than net savers, this will tend to exacerbate 
inequality. Worse, if the debtor offered collateral to obtain funds (as with a mortgage), 
the creditors retain the senior claim on that collateral – meaning that the poorer party is 
more exposed to falling asset prices than the richer creditor (Mian and Sufi 2014).  
Third, as noted before, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) have pointed to the 
marketability of US households' willingness (and ability) to borrow – contrasted with less 
willingness and ability in other regions of the world – as a primary cause in the buildup 
of global macroeconomic imbalances. In other words, the United States has a 
comparative advantage in debt formation while other countries have comparative 
advantages in household saving. This complementarity will tend to create lasting 
financial account imbalances as capital flows from savers to borrowers. This, in turn, 
produces pressure for capital exporters to run a negative current account and capital 
importers to run matching current account surpluses. Such a comparative advantage in 
debt formation has arguably been on display in the eurozone over recent years, with 
household borrowers in the periphery matched with household savers in the European 
interior.  
 This discussion of consequences is valuable because it illustrates that the degree 
to which households have become entangled in financial markets varies from country to 
country and – more importantly – suggests that this variation can help to explain real-
world outcomes. While the direction of change is broadly uniform, the magnitude of 
change is not. Among OECD countries, the largest increase in the ratio of household to 
non-financial sector borrowing from 2000-07 occurred in Greece. The only two countries 
in which that ratio fell over the same period were Germany and Austria. Indeed, as figure 
7 shows, households in the entire group of European "periphery" countries experienced 
greater household financial integration than that of Germany. While this finding is 
narrow and inconclusive, it is consistent with each of the points presented above: that the 
degree of household integration into financial markets has generally increased – and that 
severe negative consequences have been felt where that increase is largest.  
 
III: Households as Bridges 
Thus far, this paper has presented a collection of empirical data lacking a theoretical 
home – those facts being that (1) households have intensified their interactions with the 
financial sector; (2) these interactions have economic consequences; and (3) such 
interactions and their consequences vary from country to country. Having established this, 
how can we better incorporate them into existing theory?  
 
Between IPE and CPE 
Households are particularly relevant to bridging the gap between IPE and CPE because 
their financial interactions are, paradoxically, both more "international" and more 
"national" than the financial activities of most banks and non-financial firms.  
This statement requires some explanation: household finance is more 
"transnational" because of the relatively homogenous nature of household financial 
interactions. In a world where capital can move freely across borders, household savings 
(i.e., deposits) are added to an essentially global pool of loanable funds. Household 
borrowing then draws down funds from that pool. In practice, the world doesn't exactly 
work like this: home bias in investment means that financial institutions have a tendency 
to keep funds within the countries in which they originate (Tesar and Werner 1995). The 
best explanation for this bias is informational. That is, investors can more easily collect 
information about potential investment outlets in their own country than in others. This 
gives them an advantage in finding the best uses for capital when compared to their 
international competitors (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2009).   
Household finance is more "transnational" because it is potentially less bound by 
home bias. The reason for this is the underlying homogeneity in household financial 
contracts. Mortgages are among the most standardized financial contracts in the world; 
large numbers of contracts are offered on substantially similar terms. This homogeneity – 
and the large number of contracts offered – explain why American-style securitization 
works in the first place. Just as banks can adjust their reserves on hand to avoid bank runs 
by knowing households' typical withdrawal activities, banks can usually predict the 
delinquency rate on a portfolio of similar consumer loans. Based on that information, 
they can buy and sell the payment streams from their mortgage books as securitized 
assets.  
Through the process of securitization, the idiosyncratic features of a particular 
financial contract are largely eliminated: it doesn't matter if a handful of homeowners 
default because their individual payments comprise such a small piece of the securitized 
asset. Information about the end-borrower thus becomes less relevant. Contrast this with 
a corporate bond, in which the holder of the bond is entirely exposed to default by one 
actor. In that situation, more information will be needed before someone is willing to buy 
the bond. 
This difference also helps explain how firms around the world became exposed to 
the US mortgage industry prior to the financial crisis: financial institutions bought and 
sold payment streams without much of any information about the end-borrower. This 
would be relatively uncommon for international trade in sovereign debt or corporate 
bonds (though more common for equities markets, where investors buy and sell entire 
indices). That is not to say the market for mortgages is globally unified: disparate 
underwriting rules ensure that an American mortgage and a German mortgage remain 
substantially different. Even so, SIFMA data shows that the issuance of multinational 
MBS (i.e., securities comprised of payment streams on mortgages coming from multiple 
countries) is not insubstantial. Before the crisis, the market for these assets amounted to 
some $300 billion, more than double the size of the French and German MBS markets 
combined.  
This loss of informational fidelity is largely important from an IPE standpoint 
because it teaches us something about the flow of capital between countries. At the same 
time, however, household financial interactions remain more "national" than the financial 
activities of many other actors. The point here is that households cannot engage in venue 
shopping and regulatory arbitrage in the same way that a large bank or firm can. In 
simpler language, an Italian mortgage-seeker has to deal with Italian financial rules and 
Italian financiers in a way that UniCredit or Fiat does not. Households, by virtue of their 
relative immobility and lack of financial sophistication, are simply more exposed to 
national idiosyncrasies than big banks and big business.  
Put together, the relatively "national" and "transnational" nature of household 
finance illustrates that we need both IPE and CPE perspectives in order to understand 
what is going on – and we need those subfields to talk to each other. Ignore the 
international marketability of assets produced by consumer borrowing – or alternatively, 
overlooking the national determinants that shape borrowing behavior of households in the 
first place – are equally unwise. 
 
Across the Financialization Archipelago 
The tougher – but arguably more fruitful – gap to span is between the various 
perspectives on financialization and CPE. Heterodox macroeconomics tends focus on 
economic systems in general, which has the indirect effect of homogenizing capitalism 
across countries. However, it does not homogenize capitalism across time: 
financialization is a process that has resulted in capitalist systems evolving over a period 
of years. CPE has the complementary strengths and weaknesses: it is well-suited to 
understanding spatial disparities between capitalist systems but has more trouble with 
change across time.  
The opportunity at a macro level seems clear: by connecting the financialization 
literature with CPE, we can come to a better understanding of how capitalism changes 
across both time and space. Ewald Engelen and Martijn Konings (2010, 620) note as 
much in their contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
lamenting "that the financialization of contemporary capitalism has not received 
sufficient attention from comparative institutionalism and the VoC-literature." Engelen 
and Konings have done more than most to bridge the divide between financialization and 
CPE scholarship, positing the existence of three varieties of financialization 
"trajectories." This approach is promising – yielding the benefits of both cross-spatial and 
cross-temporal analysis. Moreover, it matches closely with what Wolfgang Streeck 
(2010) has highlighted as a central problem with VOC theorizing: the lack of historical 
context and dynamism in trying to isolate static capitalist varieties.  
At the same time, the theoretical ambition of financialization scholarship makes 
some scholars wary. The penchant for making broad generalizations about systemic 
change is what defines heterodox thinkers as heterodox – and can exclude them from 
certain discussions. Our discussion of household finance therefore represents an 
opportunity for finding overlap at the more intermediate theoretical level. By focusing on 
the financial integration of households, we can develop a framework that doesn't 
surrender the broader ambitions of the financialization agenda but also doesn't require all 
connected research to buy into the idea of a profound transformation at the very heart of 
global capitalism.  
 
A Synthesis 
Such a framework, constructed from the two theoretical bridges described in this section 
and the facts presented in the preceding pages, can be summed up in five causal 
assertions:  
 
1. Global financial liberalization has brought households – as a sector – further into 
global capital markets as both creditors and debtors; 
2. Such integration has significant consequences on domestic and international 
economic outcomes; 
3. National policy and institutional configurations still exert tremendous influence 
over the activities of households on an individual level; 
4. Such policies and configurations – and how they evolve – diverge across 
economies; 
5. The result is divergent macroeconomic consequences. 
 
These assertions accommodate the facts concerning the rise of household finance, the 
paradox of households' "international" and "national" roles, the transformation of 
capitalist systems over time, and the role of national features in mediating that 
transformation. Analyses in this vein can therefore speak to the empirical record while 
also speaking to IPE, CPE, and financialization theorists in equal measure.  
 
IV: The Puzzles Ahead 
The exercise of building an intermediate-level theory of household financialization would 
be pointless if it did not help us provide answers to real empirical puzzles. Fortunately, 
these puzzles can be found in abundance.  
First, we need a better understanding of the consequences of households' altered 
financial interactions. On the international level, this largely concerns how capital is 
allocated across borders: that is, to what degree are global macroeconomic imbalances 
determined by household behaviors? If household borrowing is encouraged in certain 
areas of the world and mitigated in others, this will have an affect on the balance of 
payments. Borrowing systems would tend to run financial account surpluses and 
mitigating systems would run the matching deficits. This has implications for how we 
think about comparative advantage: we normally think about comparative advantage in 
terms of a country's current account, determining what an economy exports. But if a 
country is better suited to sell highly marketable assets based on consumer credit, it 
effectively has a comparative advantage in the export of assets. This has implications for 
the study of external imbalances between countries – and more work is needed on what 
those implications are. On the domestic level, there are potential connections between 
household finance and macroeconomic instability as well as between household finance 
and inequality. The latter has been subject to some study (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2014), 
though more comparative research is called for.  
Second, we really don't understand why countries approach household finance 
differently. Clearly, national preferences toward household financial interactions vary – 
but what causes those variations? Culture, policy myopia, intergenerational political 
conflict, and diversity within institutions and how they are linked together are all likely 
candidates. A survey of preliminary work into these determinants would take more space 
than is available here. Suffice to say, however, that these works are preliminary and ad 
hoc, failing to cohere into a satisfying explanation. 
Finally – on a programmatic level – the causal links between liberalization and 
heightened household financial interactions also need to be better fleshed out. The same 
is true of the specific links between nationally distinct features and the attendant 
consequences.  
In short, this is a research agenda with many tasks ahead of it. But those tasks are 
worth the effort. Moreover, they should be approached through a common framework – 
such as the one presented here – that encourages the cross-pollination of ideas between 
IPE, CPE, and heterodox macroeconomics. 
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